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SIPDIS

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SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF CHAD/SUDAN PEACE ACCORD

Classified By: Political Counselor David G. Mosby

11. (C) Summary: The fourth meeting of the Contact group for the implementation of the Dakar Accord between Chad and Sudan is scheduled to take place on June 17. The meeting follows the June 23-27 meeting military experts group, detailed below. The military experts adopted a basic draft operation plan for the establishment of a multinational Peace and Security Force consisting of an observation and monitoring force made of officers from the African Contact Group member countries and a mixed protection comprised of 1,000 Sudanese and 1,000 Chadian troops. The Peace and Security Force is to man 10 observation posts along the border between Chad and Sudan to monitor the movements of rebel groups close to the border on both sides. The force's staff headquarters is to be in Tripoli under the command of a Libyan colonel. It is unclear if the Contact Group is now intending to adopt or approve the work of the military experts. End summary.

12. (U) On July 17, the fourth meeting of the Contact Group for the implementation of the Dakar Accord between Chad and Sudan is scheduled to take place. The accord, signed during the March Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) under the auspices of Senegalese President Adoulaye Wade, calls for the establishment of an observation force to monitor the border between Chad and Sudan. The Contact Group which is made up of Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Eritrea, Libya, and Senegal, as well as the OIC, is charged with developing a plan for implementing accord. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with the European Union (EU), the United Nations, the African Union (AU), and the African regional organizations the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), and the Central African Economic Community (CEAC) have all been requested to participate in the meeting as observers. The USG will be represented by Political Counselor.

The Draft Military Operations Plan

13. (SBU) This meeting of the Contact Group follows the June 23-27 meeting of Contact Group's working group of military experts. At that meeting, which was chaired by Libyan Colonel Muftah Mohamed and co-chaired by Congolese General Jean Marie Michel Mokoko and Senegalese General Antou Pierre Ndiaye, the military experts discussed and agreed to a basic military operations plan for implementing the Dakar Accord. The plan calls for the establishment of a multinational peace and security force (PSF). The PSF will have two elements: 1) an observation and monitoring force consisting of military representatives of each of the country members of the Contact Group, including Chad and Sudan; and 2) a mixed or bi-national protection force consisting of 1,000 Sudanese and

1,000 Chadian soldiers to ensure the security of the observation force.

¶4. (SBU) The plan calls for the PSF to be commanded by a Libyan colonel and the staff headquarters to be in Tripoli. The Libyan colonel is to be supported by a Congolese deputy, a Senegalese intelligence officer, Gabonese administrative and logistics officers, an Eritrean liaison officer, as well as liaison officers from Sudan and Chad. The observation force will be based in 10 observation posts along the border between Chad and Sudan) five on each side. Two of the observation posts are to serve as secondary command posts) one on each side. El-Genina in Sudan and Abeche in Chad have been designated for this role. Each Contact Group member country has agreed to provide two officers for the secondary command posts and one for each of the rest.

¶5. (SBU) The mixed protection force will operate out of the same observation posts. Two hundred soldiers will be assigned to each observation post -- 100 from Sudan and 100 from Chad -- so that each country will have five hundred of its own troops operating on the other side of the border. However, the mixed protection force will not be under the command of the observation force. Both will be under the command and control of the staff headquarters in Tripoli, which will report to a representative of the Contact Group.

¶6. (SBU) The military experts calculated that it will cost \$30 million to implement the plan the first year. Sudan and Chad are to provide their own soldiers and cover their costs for the mixed protection force. However, the Contact Group

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hopes to have the international community pay for the multinational observer force.

Sudan Drags its Feet

¶7. (C) The military experts meetings got off to an inauspicious beginning. The Sudanese did not show the first day and although they had successfully arrived later that day they chose to be late to morning the following morning. From the beginning, the Sudanese head of delegation, General Ibrahim Izzelduin, questioned the basic mission of peace and security force, although the military experts had been tasked by Foreign Affairs Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio in the name of the Contact Group to come up with a technical plan to implement what had already been agreed to politically. The Sudanese seemed to be proposing to reopen issues that the other delegates thought had been decided.

Conflict Between Mediators

¶8. (C) Also from the beginning it was clear that there was tension between the Libyan chair and his Senegalese and Congolese co-chairs, such that the Congolese General Mokoko left the meeting at one point in a fit of pique and did not return until the following day. While each country was asked to make a contribution to the task, it was Congo that produced the most thorough and detailed proposal for a draft operations plan. One which essentially mirrored Chad,s less comprehensive proposal. However, for much of the meeting the Libyan chair and delegation actively worked against Congo,s proposal serving as the template for the groups work because of Libya,s desire to have the conclusions of the process verbal of the Tripoli meeting of the Contact Group adopted in this military experts meeting because they had not been adopted in Tripoli due to Sudan,s absence from the meeting.

¶9. (C) Finally, delegates from Senegal and others were able to convince the Libyan chair that the conclusions from the Tripoli meeting could be noted and adopted in the process verbal the military experts meeting and the Congolese plan could serve as the template for the draft operational plan.

However, once they agreed to that basic formula Libya and Sudan worked in concert to remove all mention of the United Nations or the wider international community from the document. Whereas the Congolese draft specifically described the PSF,s mission as an Article VI peacekeeping mission, the final draft adopted by the contact group did not. Moreover, the role of the AU vis--vis the force is unclear because Sudan and Libya successfully manage to reduce the status of the AU representative to that of a mere observer.

¶11. (C) General Ndiaye and Colonel Barthelemy of Senegal both expressed frustration to Political Counselor regarding the maneuverings of Libya and Sudan. They described Libya, acting on Sudan,s behalf, as determined to control everything and to eliminate the possibility of any UN participation or even official designation as an AU mission. At one point Sudan even objected to the use of the word &peace8 in the name of the force arguing that it is a &UN8 term. Ostensibly, this is because Sudan is afraid that the force will evolve from being an African one to being a hybrid one as in the case of UNAMID. Senegal is adamant that their must be international participation in the mission if it is to succeed.

Comment

¶12. (C) It is unclear what was agreed to in the end. Although a process verbal was adopted and signed by the members of the contact group along with a draft military operations plan as an annex, there was no time for the Contact Group to discuss the annex in detail in plenary. Moreover, after having signed the process verbal, the Sudanese head of delegation proceeded to take issue with passages of the draft operational plan in spite of the fact that his subordinates had worked on the plan with the other members of the contact group in break out sessions. Bizarrely, the Libyan chair suggested that the offending passages could simply be removed although the document had already been adopted. The Senegalese co-chair, General Ndiaye, objected on procedural grounds and pointed out that the entire contact group needed to discuss the matter. At

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which point there was no more time left, and the meeting was adjourned.

¶13. The French representative, Colonel Charles de Kersabiec, defense attach in Dakar, and the British by their non-resident ambassador to Chad based in Yaound, Syd Maddicott, as well as the representatives from the EU all expressed dismay at how the meeting was conducted as well as their lack of confidence in the outcome. Colonel de Kersabiec took issue with the lack professionalism and quality of the draft operation planning noting that the draft plan fails to delineate the specific area of operations or specify the obligations of the mixed protection force vis--vis the observation force (e.g., If the observation force is under attack how much time is an acceptable amount of time for the protection to respond). Moreover, at times it appeared that the antagonists might have more easily come to an agreement without the presence of the warring chair and co-chairs. Finally, none of the African participants expressed much confidence that the PSF would be deployed any time soon. A Congolese colonel told Political Counselor, &If this happens within a year, you can cut off my head.8 SMITH